Ten misconceptions about the Nuclear
Deal
By
P. K. Iyengar,
Chairman (Retd.),
Atomic Energy Commission
In spite of the fact that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the
national interest, many in the country, and in Parliament, support it
because of misconceptions about the deal, which need to be clarified.
1. The nuclear deal is an
agreement between India and the US for the US government to supply
nuclear fuel and reactors to India.
Contrary to common perception, the nuclear deal or the 123 Agreement
is not a commitment on the part of the US government to provide us
with uranium or nuclear reactors. Presently American law prohibits
nuclear cooperation with India because we have not signed the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All the nuclear deal does is to grant
a 'waiver' from that law, so that American companies can now pursue
nuclear trade with India. However, if India conducts a test at any
time, the waiver is revoked.
2. Imported uranium and
nuclear reactors will be cheap and cost-effective.
Even if the nuclear deal is made operational, the actual sale of
uranium and nuclear reactors will be governed by market forces – there
are no guarantees of cheap or competitive nuclear power. To the
contrary, there is every reason to believe that it will be expensive.
The cost of uranium in the international market has gone up four-fold
in the last few years, and will rise further with further demand. The
same is true of the cost of steel and other materials used in a
reactor. Manpower costs are much higher in the West. The example of
the Dhabol power plant has already shown us that importing power
plants from the West is not necessarily a viable option. We would do
well to learn from that experience.
3 The nuclear deal will
safeguard our energy security.
It is true that nuclear energy is green energy, and therefore
essential for our long-term energy security. But this does not
translate into the nuclear deal will ensure our energy security. Power
from the nuclear reactors that we buy will definitely be more
expensive than indigenous nuclear power. Further, to keep the reactors
running, we will always be dependent on imported uranium, which is
controlled by a cartel – the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Therefore,
the nuclear deal, by making us dependent on the cartel, will only
compromise our energy security. Only our indigenous nuclear power
programme can truly ensure our energy security. And in any case, for
the next few decades, nuclear power will not exceed 6% of our total
electricity production.
4. Importing nuclear plants
is a quick-fix solution to the present power crisis.
Nuclear technology is sensitive. Even if the nuclear deal goes
through, it will take time to buy and setup new reactors. We have
examples of the French reactors in China, and the Russian reactors in
Kudankulam, India. It will actually take longer to setup foreign
reactors compared to indigenous ones. Just the negotiations and legal
formalities could take years. It will be at least eight years before
we see the first power. So importing reactors is certainly no quick
solution. For the short term, we will still have to rely on coal and
hydroelectricity.
5. The nuclear deal does not
stop India from further nuclear testing, and therefore does not
compromise our national security.
It is very clearly stated in the 123 Agreement it will be subject to
national laws, and the Hyde Act is a law of the US. Therefore, the 123
Agreement is certainly circumscribed by the Hyde Act, which very
clearly states that if India tests a nuclear device, all further
nuclear trade is to stop, and the nuclear materials that have already
been sold to us have to be returned. No future Indian government would
dare to jeopardise such a huge investment in nuclear power, by
testing. So, for all practical purposes the nuclear deal caps our
strategic programme – which is precisely what the Americans intend.
6. We can pass a national law
to counteract the Hyde Act, and this will protect our strategic
programme.
Just as the Hyde Act is not binding on us, our laws are not binding on
the US. We can certainly amend our Atomic Energy Act to enable
participation of the private sector in nuclear power. But if we pass a
law saying that we will retain the right to test, it will have no
influence on the actions of the US. If and when we test, they can
simply quote the 123 Agreement and the Hyde Act, and pull out all
their nuclear materials, leaving us devastated. The only option here
is to renegotiate the 123 Agreement and have the clause inserted
there. However, the Americans are unlikely to agree to this, since it
goes against their non-proliferation policy.
7. The nuclear deal and the
safeguards agreement give India the status of a nuclear power.
While the 18 July 2005 Joint Statement did indeed talk about India
being treated as an equal by the US, neither the 123 Agreement nor the
IAEA Safeguards Agreement, have borne out those optimistic statements.
In fact, the IAEA safeguards agreement that has been negotiated is
closely based on the model agreement that IAEA has for non-nuclear
weapon states. The safeguards agreements that the nuclear weapon
countries have signed with the IAEA require them to put very few
reactors under safeguards, and allow them to take reactors out of
safeguards. India, however, will have to place most of its reactors
under safeguards for perpetuity. Therefore we are certainly not being
treated as a nuclear weapons country.
8. Without the nuclear deal,
we cannot get adequate uranium for our domestic nuclear programme.
The Department of Atomic Energy has always maintained that we have
enough indigenous uranium for 10,000 MW of nuclear power for 30 years.
We are not yet close to that number. The present mismatch in uranium
availability for operating reactors is a consequence of poor planning,
and inadequate prospecting and mining. There is talk of importing
40,000 MW of nuclear power, which will cost not less than $100 billion
or Rs. 4 lakh crores. If even 10% of this money were spent on uranium
mining in existing mines in Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya, on searching
for new uranium deposits, and negotiating with non-NSG countries,
there will be enough uranium for a robust indigenous nuclear power
programme, until such time as thorium reactors takes over.
9. The safeguards agreement
with the IAEA guarantees fuel supplies even if India conducts a
nuclear test.
The safeguards agreement only notes, in the preamble, that India's
concurrence to the safeguards is linked to getting fuel supplies.
However, the IAEA has no role in this matter, and certainly, no such
commitment is given in the safeguards agreement. It also notes that
India may take 'corrective measures' in the event of a disruption of
foreign fuel supplies. It does not specify what these measures will
be, it does not provide for any role for the IAEA in this, and it does
not bestow legitimacy on any such measures that India may take. It may
well be that any such measures that we suggest, such as importing fuel
from another country, will be disallowed by the nuclear cartel (the
NSG). The only tangible corrective measure is for India to explore and
mine more uranium, and to enhance the enrichment capability to provide
fuel for those reactors. The latter is subject to uncertainty.
10. The nuclear deal has no
impact on our foreign policy.
The Hyde Act states clearly that it is the policy of the US to secure
India's cooperation on a number of issues involving Iran, including
its capability to reprocess nuclear fuel (in spite of the fact that
Iran, as an NPT signatory, has the right to enrich uranium for use in
light-water reactors). This has nothing to do with the nuclear deal,
and can only be related to influencing our foreign policy. Recent
statements by Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs
Committee, regarding Indo-Iran gas pipeline, only add fuel to such
suspicions.
It can therefore be seen, that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the
national interest. It presents the very serious danger of capping our
strategic programme. That alone is reason enough not to go forward
with the deal. Additionally, it does not guarantee the energy security
that we are seeking, and, in fact, may only end up making us as
vulnerable to the nuclear cartel, as we are today to the oil cartel.
It is easy to see why the US wants this deal so badly. At virtually no
cost, since there is no commitment towards fuel supplies, they can cap
our strategic programme, bring us into the NPT net, through the back
door, as a non-nuclear power, keep a close eye on our nuclear
activities, including R&D, through intrusive IAEA inspections, and
subjugate us to the wishes of the nuclear cartel. If there were no
cartel, we could have easily extended the Kudankulam agreement for
more reactors, and avoided the present situation. If these are not
reasons enough not to go ahead with the nuclear deal, then there are
no reasons that reason can find.
- Dr. P. K. Iyengar
Chairman (Retd.), Atomic Energy Commission
About : Dr P. K. Iyengar has
been associated for over four decades with the Indian Department of
Atomic Energy. Dr.Iyengar took over as Director of the Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre in 1984 and was appointed Chairman of the Indian
Atomic Energy Commission in 1990.
In his long career Dr. P.K.Iyengar has been the recipient of many
awards and honours, including the S. S. Bhatnagar Award and the Padma
Bhushan |
